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Abstract
Empirical evidencesuggests thatmostﬁrmsoperateinimperfectlycompetitive markets.
We develop a search-matching model between wholesalers and retailers. Firms face search
costs and form long-term relationships. Price bargain results in both wholesaler and retailer
markups, depending on ﬁrms’ relative bargaining power. We simulate the model to explore
the role of product market search frictions in business cycles. We show that the way search
costs are modelled is crucial to provide a realistic picture of ﬁrms’ business environment
and improve the cyclical properties of an otherwise standard real business cycle model.
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Empirical evidence suggests that most ﬁrms operate in imperfectly competitive markets, where
theyhavesomepowerofsettingpricesthemselves, andformlong-termrelationshipswiththeir
customers, which are predominantly other ﬁrms. These relationships are typically governed by
implicit or explicit contracts. Available evidence also shows that ﬁrms produce substantial ef-
fort, typicallyinformofadvertisingormarketing, toﬁndnewcustomersandselltheirproducts
to. For instance, in the US total advertising expenditures have been close to 2.5% of GDP over
the last 10 years. This effort may also cause an economic chain reaction by increasing sales,
consumption and employment. In the standard Walrasian real business cycle model (hereafter
RBC, see for instance King and Rebelo (1999) for an in depth exposition), the product market is
perfectly competitive and adjustments occur without frictions. Given the above stylised facts,
this paper aims to provide a more realistic story of business relationships and price formation
mechanism than in the RBC model, and explores whether this can play a signiﬁcant role in the
propagation of shocks.
More precisely, we replace the Walrasian product market of the standard business cycle model
with a product market with frictions by following Pissarides (2000) and the associated search-
matching literature. In our model, downstream producers act as wholesalers and have long-
term relationships with upstream retailers, who in turn sell to ﬁnal consumers. Retailers act as
intermediaries between producers and consumer; they alleviate the search costs for ﬁnal con-
sumers. We believe that this is fair characterization of most product markets in industrialized
economies. Only in very special markets do producers sell directly to consumers without in-
termediaries. Wholesalers produce effort (e.g. advertising or marketing) to ﬁnd retailers to sell
their products to. Retailers produce effort (e.g. by employing purchasing managers) to ﬁnd
wholesalers to buy their products from in order to reﬁll their stores and enlarge their selection.
The amount of products exchanged therefore depends on their respective search efforts. More-
over, every buyer-seller contact generates a surplus over which the wholesaler and the retailer
bargain. We therefore provide a story how wholesalers and retailers meet in the market and
for the subsequent price formation mechanism between them. Still, our model makes use of a
simple representation and remains very close to the standard RBC model.1
The role of marketing frictions (usually consumer search frictions) have been analyzed to ex-
plain industry and ﬁrm dynamics (Fishman and Rob (2003)) and in the literature in interna-
tional business cycles to explain price differences between countries (Alessandria (2004, 2009))
or the behaviour of imports, exports and the terms of trade (Drozd and Nosal (2008)). In stan-
dard (closed economy) RBC models, most papers introducing imperfections in the product
1We acknowledge that the model in this paper provides a too simplistic view of what in reality can be considered
a rather complex relationship between buyer and seller. Clearly, contracting parties do not only bargain prices, but
also quantities, discounts, after sales services, etc... However, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
2market assume monopolistic wholesalers, as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Messina (2006)
or the recent DSGE literature (see for instance Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters
(2003)). Alternatively, in Fagnart et al. (2007), wholesalers experience privately observed and
uninsured idiosyncratic shocks, which generates a sub-optimal equilibrium. But none of these
approaches allow for bilateral relationships and negotiations between wholesalers and retail-
ers. Very recent related approaches that aim at providing better descriptions of customer-ﬁrm
relationships are those by Hall (2008), Arsenau and Chugh (2007) and Kleshchelski and Vincent
(2007). Hall (2008) explores customer search and seller recruiting by adapting principles of the
labour market search and matching models to the product market. In his model, producers
invest heavily in attracting ﬁnal customers, as they receive a large share of the surplus. Hall’s
approach is concerned with retail markets, and there are frictions but no bargaining between
customers and sellers. Arsenau and Chugh (2007) extend Hall’s model and explore the effects
of different bargaining assumptions. They speciﬁcally set out to analyse how the distributive
role of prices through the notion of fairness affects price dynamics. In Kleshchelski and Vincent
(2007), customers incur switching costs. Customers and ﬁrms form long-term relationships and
idiosyncratic marginal shocks are only incompletely passed through into prices. However, all
three approaches are concerned with the relationship between retail ﬁrms and ﬁnal consumers,
whereas our model provides a story of ﬁrms’ relationships and of the price formation process.
Moreover, we provide an in depth exploration of the RBC and welfare properties and compare
simulation results to real US data.
Our key ﬁndings are as follows: First, the price bargain results in one markup for whole-
salers and another markup for retailers. Respective markups depend on the relative bargaining
power of the wholesalers and the retailers. Markups are procyclical with a productivity shock
and countercyclical with “friction shocks”. Second, what is important for the results are not
frictions per se but the way search costs are modelled.2 In particular, convex search costs are
able to produce hump-shaped dynamics for all variables, a highly persistent output and a real-
istic representation of the product market variables (search and prices). Third, if the total size
of the markups (because directly linked to search costs, cf. above) is important for the whole
results, the way total markups are split between wholesalers and retailers is only distributive
and therefore only affect product market variables. Fourth, welfare costs of frictions are quan-
titatively sizeable with a reasonable calibration.
Section 2 provides some selective evidence on the product market functioning and further mo-
tivation of this paper. Sections 3 and 4 develop and discuss the search-matching model with
frictions in the product market and price bargain. Sections 5 and 6 present the calibration and
some numerical simulations for US data. Section 7 computes the welfare costs of the different
2The labour market literature also recently stressed this kind of results (role of vacancy opening costs for the
volatility of labour market variables), see for instance Yashiv (2006) or Fujita and Ramey (2007).
3inefﬁciencies and section 8 concludes.
2 On ﬁrms’ business environment
It is widely accepted that most ﬁrms operate in markets, which are governed by imperfections
or frictions. By providing search effort ﬁrms try to overcome market imperfections. This is
motivated by recent evidence, in particular from recent ﬁrm surveys. Following the lead by
Blinder et al. (1998) ﬁrm surveys have been conducted for several industrial countries/areas
over the last decade, which improved our understanding of ﬁrms’ business environment and
price setting practices.3 According to those surveys, it seems that a fair characterisation of a
typical or representative ﬁrm’s business environment is that it operates an imperfectly compet-
itive market and uses some form of mark up pricing above marginal cost as its predominant
form of price-setting practice, thereby implying that it is able exert some market power.4 This
ﬁrm engages in business-to-business (B2B) rather than business-to-consumer (B2C) relation-
ships, where it typically does most business with repeat customers and forms long-term rela-
tionships with them. A long-term relationship, which can also be regarded as one form of an
implicit contract based on principles of trust and fairness, is an effective way to reduce search
cost, which the ﬁrm otherwise would have to bear. Together, these surveys provide a strik-
ingly coherent set of empirical results and a challenge to many modelling assumptions usually
employed in standard Walrasian macroeconomic models.
To substantiate the above points, consider that in the US, 85% of ﬁrms surveyed by Blinder et al.
(1998) indicate that they mainly engage in long-term relationships with their customers. 77%
of their main customers are other ﬁrms. The corresponding ﬁgures for other industrialised
economies are of similar magnitudes (EA 70% and Sweden 86% for the share of long-term
customers and 75 and 70% for the share of other ﬁrms as main customers). Furthermore, these
long-term relationships are mainly governed by contracts. 50% of US ﬁrms responded that
they have 60% or more of their sales covered by explicit or written contracts, which according
to Blinder et al. (1998) is estimated to correspond to 38% of US GDP. The contracts typically
last one year (both the median and the mode are 12 months). Furthermore, this theory is of
more importance for ﬁrms that are primarily engaged in B2B relationships. Surveys for other
industrialised countries generally corroborate these ﬁndings (see Amirault et al. (2004), Apel
et al. (2005) and Fabiani et al. (2006, 2007)).
Since the product market is necessarily imperfect, there is a need for search of customers, and
3See Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada, Fabiani et al. (2006, 2007) for 9 euro area (EA) countries, Nakagawa et al.
(2000) for Japan, Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden and Hall et al. (2000) for the UK.
4For example, 54% of euro area ﬁrms answered that they use a mark up pricing strategy. 73% of euro area ﬁrms
said that their main market is the domestic market. In Canada, the corresponding ﬁgure is 81%.
4thus advertising and marketing effort, and a need for search of suppliers. The need for adver-
tising, marketing, promotions, public relations, and sales managers provided almost 600,000
jobs in 2006. Similarly, roughly an equally large number of people were engaged in purchasing
and buying occupations (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). This represents almost 0.5% of total
US employment for each. And still in the US, total annual expenditures in advertising in all
the media represented on average 2.4% of GDP over the last decades. In other words, adver-
tising expenditures amounted to 271 billions US dollars in 2005. Figure 1 also shows that over
the economic cycle, advertising expenditures are positively correlated with GDP, have a higher
volatility than GDP, especially over the last years, and are very persistent. This ﬁgure includes
spending for advertising in newspapers, magazines, radio, television, direct mail, billboards
and displays, Internet, and other forms, and thus also includes the advertising that is directly
targeted towards ﬁnal consumers, such as car manufacturers’ or pharmaceuticals’ television
adverts.5 Although producers may directly target consumers, consumers buy via intermedi-
aries and hence advertising towards consumers indirectly affects retailers.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 about here]
3 Model
There are three types of agents in the economy: households, wholesale ﬁrms and retail ﬁrms.
Goods are produced by wholesale ﬁrms and consumed by households. However, conversely
to the standard real business cycle literature, we do not assume that products are directly ex-
changed between producers and consumers; instead we introduce retailers as intermediaries.
Retailers buy from producers, who act as wholesalers, and sell to households. Trade frictions
are present in the product market between wholesalers and retailers, and we provide an ex-
plicit theory of price determination since every wholesaler-retailer cont(r)act generates a sur-
plus over which ﬁrms bargain. More precisely, the product market consists of a two-sided
search market between sellers (wholesale ﬁrms) and buyers (retail ﬁrms). Let Tt be the number
of contracts between wholesale-retail pairs at period t, a contract meaning that both parties
agree to exchange one unit of output. These contracts terminate and the pairs separate at the
exogenous rate 0 < χ < 1. The contract duration is, thus, on average given by d = 1/χ.
This results in a continuous depletion of the stock of contracts, and thus trade volume, and
consequently a need to reﬁll it. In order to do so, wholesale ﬁrms provide a search effort St
(marketing or advertising expenditures) to ﬁnd new buyers; and retail ﬁrms provide a search
effort Dt (by purchasing agents) to ﬁnd new sellers. The number of new matches between sell-
ers and buyers is increasing and concave in the search efforts, and assumed to be generated by
5Source: www.galbithink.org/ad-spending.htm.
5a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function:





where ¯ m > 0 and 0 < γ < 1. In analogy to the labour market, the relationship between the
search effort of wholesalers and retailers can be regarded as a product market equivalent of
the “Beveridge curve”. It has search effort of wholesalers on the vertical axis and search ef-
fort of retailers on the horizontal. It slopes downwards as wholesalers produce higher effort
(advertising) when retailers are reluctant buying goods. Downward and upward shifts in this
curve would signify structural improvements and deteriorations in the efﬁciency of the match-
ing process, respectively. Movements along the curve, in contrast, imply a cyclical adjustment
without alteration of the matching efﬁciency.
The trade volume evolves according to:
Tt = (1− χ)Tt−1 + Mt. (2)
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of inﬁnitively lived households. Their time en-
dowment is normalized to 1 and split between work Nt and leisure 1− Nt. Their current utility
is deﬁned as:




(1− Nt)1−η − 1
￿
, (3)
where Ct represents consumption. Utility is assumed to be concave in its arguments and speci-
ﬁed as in King and Rebelo (1999): θ ≥ 0 and η ≥ 0 is the parameter governing the labor supply
elasticity. Households receive an income from lending capital to wholesale ﬁrms at interest rate
rt + δ, and from working at a wage rate wt. In each period, they choose the size of the capital










subject to the constraints:
Ct + It = wtNt + (rt + δ)Kt + Πt, (5)
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt, (6)
where β denotes the discount factor. Equation (5) is the budget constraint. Households own
both the wholesale and the retail ﬁrms and ultimately receive their proﬁts Πt. Equation (6) is
6One has to bear in mind that all future variables are actually conditional expectations based on the information
available at time t. For instance, Zt+j stands for Et(Zt+j), where Zt may be any variable or combination of variables.
Our simpliﬁed notation is however easier to read.
6the capital accumulation equation and δ denotes the exogenous capital destruction rate. The













The economy is composed of a continuum of identical wholesale ﬁrms using capital Kt and




where ǫt is a productivity shock and 0 < α < 1. Given the selling price Pt, the ﬁrms choose
their optimal search effort, i.e. level of advertising expenditures St to ﬁnd new buyers, as well
as the optimal capital-labor ratio to produce the output level Tt. They take as given qS
t , the rate
at which every effort leads to a new match. The rate is deﬁned as:
qS
t = Mt/St. (10)















subject to the constraints (2), (9) and (10). wt and rt + δ are respectively the labor and the
capital costs. We have κ ≥ 0 and assume a convex search cost   ≥ 1.7 The discount factor βt is


















7It is worth noting that   > 1 is a kind of backdoor way to have diminishing returns in the matching func-
tion. To show this, let us deﬁne a net matching function as t(St,Dt) = M(St,Dt) − κS
 
t / . When   = 1,
t(aSt,aDt) = at(St,Dt), that is we have constant returns to scale. When   > 1, t(aSt,aDt) < at(St,Dt), that is
we have diminishing returns to scale. Alternatively, we could keep   = 1 and directly introduce diminishing re-
turns to scale into the matching function, but in this case we loose the Pareto optimality (Hosios) condition (see
section 4).






















The economy is also composed of a continuum of identical retail ﬁrms buying tradable prod-
ucts Tt, andsellingthemtohouseholds. Atgivenbuyingprice Pt, theﬁrmschoosetheiroptimal
search effort Dt, i.e. by setting aside the necessary number of purchasing and buying employ-
ees, to ﬁnd and bargain with new wholesalers. They take as given qD
t , the rate at which every
effort leads to a new match. The rate is deﬁned as:
qD
t = Mt/Dt. (16)















subject to the constraints (2) and (16). We impose the same search cost and convexity as for














3.4 Price formation and markups
Each product market match yields pure economic rents equal to the expected search costs for
wholesalers and retailers (including foregone proﬁts). The agreed price is such that these rents
are shared and in addition each party is compensated for its incurred costs of forming the
match. We follow the labour market literature (see for instance Pissarides (2000)) and assume
that the rent sharing is a solution to a Nash (1950) bargaining problem. More precisely, prices
are (re-)negotiated between wholesalers and retailers at the beginning of every period through
a Nash bargain over the surplus resulting from the match.9 Because all ﬁrms are identical, the
8See the calibration and simulation sections for a discussion.
9Note that Pt represents a real producer price (price of ﬁnal/consumer products are still normalized to 1 as in a
standard real business cycle model). The marginal mark up is equal to the average mark up because all wages are
(re-)negotiated every period. In section 6, we discuss the role of price rigidities.
























Pt = λΛt + (1− λ). (21)
Prices are therefore a weighted average of the marginal cost and 1, and increasing (resp. de-
creasing) in the bargaining power of the wholesalers (resp. retailers). If wholesalers have no
bargaining power, the price is equal to their marginal cost. If retailers have no bargaining
power , the price is equal to 1.
Wholesaler and retailer markups
The model generates two markups. The wholesaler markup is the markup above the marginal
cost and the retailer markup is the markup above the producer price. They are respectively
deﬁned as:
ϕW
t = Pt − Λt = (1− λ)(1− Λt), (22)
ϕR
t = 1− Λt = λ(1− Λt). (23)
The wholesaler markup is therefore a fraction 1− λ (wholesaler bargaining power) of the total
surplus Λt of the match, and the retailer markup is a fraction 1− λ (retailer bargaining power)
of the total surplus of the match.














It is straightforward the two markups are negatively correlated with the marginal costs. With
a productivity shock, output increases, marginal cost decreases and the markups are pro-
cyclical. We obtain a similar correlation with a government shock (higher output and lower
marginal costs because lower wages) and a preference shock for leisure (lower output and
higher marginal cost because higher wages). On the other hand, more frictions in the product
market (negative shock on ¯ m or positive shock on κ) decrease the marginal cost and output,
and therefore imply countercyclical markups.
93.5 Equilibrium deﬁnition




t=0 and a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞
t=0 = {Ct,Kt+1,St, Nt,Dt}∞
t=0 such that:
- given a sequence of prices {Pr
t}∞
t=0, {Ct,Kt+1}∞
t=0 are solutions to the household solu-
tion (7) and the product market law of motion (2)
- given a sequence of prices {Pr
t}∞
t=0, {St, Nt}∞
t=0 are solutions to the wholesaler solu-
tions (13) and (15)
- given a sequence of prices {Pr
t}∞
t=0, {Dt}∞
t=0 is solution to the retailer solution (18)
- given a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞
t=0, {rt,wt}∞
t=0 clear the capital market (5) and the
labour market (8)
- the price {Pt}∞
t=0 is set according to the Nash bargain solution (20)
4 Inefﬁciency sources
The economy we describe is characterised by two sources of inefﬁciency. The ﬁrst source is
search costs that induce an inefﬁciently low level of output. Proposition 1 shows that when
search costs disappear, the steady state tends to the Walrasian steady state: labor and capital
are priced at their respective marginal productivity, ﬁrms make no proﬁt and output is max-
imised10.
Proposition 1 (Search costs and Walrasian output)
When κ −→ 0 (no search costs), the steady state solution tends to the Walrasian one.
Proof. When κ −→ 0, ﬁrst order conditions (13) and (18) simplify to P = Λ and P = 1.
Combining Λ = 1 with equations (14) and (15), we obtain w = (1 − α)ǫ(K/N)α and r + δ =
αǫ(K/N)α−1. This means that prices are normalized to 1, wages are equal to the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor and interest rates (incl. depreciation) are equal to the marginal productivity
of capital. Moreover, by replacing P, w, r + δ in equations (11) and (17) and using (9), we see
that proﬁts of wholesalers and retailers are equal to zero. This solution is therefore equivalent
to the Walrasian one.
The second source of inefﬁciency results from the search externalities. In a decentralized econ-
omy, search process exhibits externalities, and in most cases, the decentralized equilibrium is
10Although the steady state tends to the Walrasian one, still the dynamics are different from the dynamics of a
standard Walrasian real business cycle.
10different from the social planner’s equilibrium. With search frictions in the labor market, Ho-
sios (1990), in a static environment, and Merz (1995), in a dynamic environment, show that an
efﬁciency condition (workers’ bargaining power equal to unemployed’s elasticity in the match-
ing function) exists such that the externalities are internalized and the decentralized outcome
is strictly equivalent to the social planner’s outcome. In proposition 2, we show that a similar
condition exists when the search frictions are in the product market.
Proposition 2 (Externalities in the decentralized economy)
When λ = 1− γ, the decentralized equilibrium is strictly equivalent to the social planner’s problem.
Proof. The social planner’s problem is solved in Appendix A and the equivalence between the
two solutions is proved.
In section 7, we quantify the size of these respective inefﬁciencies.
5 Calibration
The technology shock is the exogenous driving force and is assumed to be AR(1):
log(ǫt) = ρ log(ǫt−1) + uǫ
t, (26)
where ρ is the autoregressive parameter and uǫ
t ∼ N(0,σ2
ǫ).
We consider two versions of the model. We ﬁrst remove all the frictions in the product market
to obtain a standard Walrasian real business cycle model, where labor and capital are priced at
their respective marginal productivity and prices are normalized to 1 (the standard Walrasian
real business cycle is presented in Appendix B, “RBC” hereafter). We then add frictions. In
this case, labor and capital are priced below their respective marginal productivity, prices are
endogenous and lower than unity and ﬁrms make proﬁts.
We calibrate our RBC model parameters {β, δ, α, θ, η, ρ, σǫ} on quarterly data to re-
produce some stylized facts for the US economy. We fully follow King and Rebelo (1999).
The discount factor is calibrated to yield an average return to capital of 6.5% per annum:
β = 1/(1 + 0.065/4). To match a capital-output ratio of 8, the rate of capital depreciation
set to δ = 0.025. We set α = 1/3, which is the standard value for the long run capital income
share. We assume that η = 1 in order to obtain a double log utility function: U(Ct,1 − Nt) =
log(Ct) + θ log(1 − Nt). We choose θ = 3.3 to match N = 0.20, which means that 20% of total
available time is used for work. Finally, we set ρ = 0.979 and σǫ = 0.0072 to obtain realis-
tic standard deviation and autocorrelation of output. Table 1 summarizes the calibration (line
11“RBC”; similar calibration is found in King and Rebelo (1999), table 2, p. 955).
[Insert table 1 about here]
We also have the RBC parameters in the model with frictions. However, because of these fric-
tions, giving the same values to the RBC parameters changes the steady state. In particular, the
capital-output ratio and the employment level decrease (see proposition 1). To keep a similar
steady state, we re-calibrate some of these parameters. More precisely, we change δ and θ to
keep a capital-output ratio of 8 and an employment level of 0.2. The TFP process is similar
in the RBC model and the model with frictions (same ρ and σǫ). We check in the next section
how a similar TFP process introduced in different models (RBC vs. frictions) changes - or not -
the output volatility and persistence. The other parameters {λ, γ χ, κ, ¯ m} are speciﬁc to the
model with search frictions.
The “Hosios’ parameters”
If retailers (wholesalers) have no bargaining power, i.e. no market power, the wholesaler (re-
tailer) appropriates all rents from the contractual relationship. In reality, the bargaining power
of retailers and wholesalers is in-between these extreme cases. It may also vary across markets
and depend for instance on the relative size of buyers and sellers (and for example whether
ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments have to be undertaken, which gives rise to the classic hold up prob-
lem). Since we do not have any priors and data on “economy-wide” bargaining power, we
assume that wholesalers and retailers have the same bargaining power: λ = 1 − λ = 0.5.
In order to have a Pareto optimal outcome (see proposition 2), we impose γ = 1 − λ = 0.5.
The Pareto optimality assumption is fairly standard in the labour matching literature11, but we
agree this is certainly arbitrary. We therefore conduct a sensitivity analysis on these parameters
in section 6.
Search costs and total markup
In our model, prices can be adjusted every period and in any case χ governs the average length
of an actual relationship (not a price contract) between wholesalers and retailers. Empirical
evidence (see section 2) show that the length of business relationships is on average one year
(or alternatively the fraction of business relationships that are new is about 25%) and we set
χ = 0.25. Data (see section 2) say that advertising expenditures represent on average 2.4% of
output. We have no information for retailers’ search costs and assume they are equivalent to




(S  + D ) = 4.8% T.
Another important parameter is the convexity   of search costs. From equations (13) and (18),








The term on the left-hand side is the expected discounted surplus of a relationship. The term on
the right-hand side is the total search costs per new relationship multiplied by  . Linear search
costs(  = 1)meanthatcostspernewrelationshipmustbeexactlycoveredbyexpectedsurplus.
Strictly convex search costs (  > 1) mean that costs per new relationship must be more than
covered by expected surplus. Our calibration exercise therefore implies a strict relationship
between search costs, convexity and total markup. In the next section, we run simulations with
alternatively linear and quadratic search costs, at given steady state for total search costs (cf.
above). The former case leads to Λ ∼ = 0.95, i.e. the total markup needed is 0.05, whereas the
latter case leads to Λ ∼ = 0.90, i.e. the total markup needed must increase to 0.1. However, given
the uncertainty around the estimation of total search costs, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on
this variable in section 6.
Other parameters
A result of the calibration exercise is that the value of κ is unimportant for the simulations.
Indeed, at given total costs and at given  , a higher κ will only implies lower steady state
values for S and D, and a higher implied value for ¯ m (matching efﬁciency parameter), leaving
unchanged κS/qS and κD/qD and hence the linearized equations.12 We simply choose κ to
have matching probabilities close to 0.5. Another direct implication is that assuming different
κ’s for wholesalers and retailers would not change our simulation results.
The parameters for each version of the model with frictions (linear vs. quadratic search costs)
are displayed in table 1 (lines “  = 1” and “  = 2”).
6 Simulations
We use the autoregressive productivity shock and simulate three different models: (i) the stan-
dard Walrasian real business cycle model (RBC), (ii) the model with frictions in the product
market presented in section 3 and linear search costs (  = 1), and (iii) the same model but with
quadratic search costs (  = 2). We compare results to the business cycle characteristics of US
data (see Appendix C). The simulation results as well as the US statistics are reported in table 2
and ﬁgure 2 (similar results for the RBC version are found in King and Rebelo (1999), table 3
12As already explained, this is because parameters are calibrated to match some steady state values. In section 7
(welfare cost of inefﬁciencies), we instead ﬁx parameters leaving the steady state free to move. As we will see,
changes in κ have then obviously steady state and dynamic effects.
13p. 957 and ﬁgure 10 p. 968).
[Insert table 2 and ﬁgure 2 about here]
It is well known that although the Walrasian RBC model does a good job in reproducing con-
sumption and investment behaviour, it suffers from some weaknesses: (i) employment is not
volatile enough and wages are too procyclical, (ii) the autocorrelation of output is too weak
although the autocorrelation of the shock is close to one (not enough endogenous persistence
in the model), and (iii) there are no smooth impulse responses (except for consumption and
wages).
The results with linear search frictions are very close to the RBC results. The only improve-
ment comes from the - slightly - smoother reaction of GDP and investment due to the search
and matching process on the product market. We also see that frictions dampen the absolute
volatility of output (numbers between brackets in table 2). Looking at variables speciﬁc to the
model with frictions, we see that the advertisement expenditures are procyclical and highly
volatile as in data. However, the reaction is very short-lived (autocorrelation close to zero).
The short-lived costs combined with   = 1 make that surplus (markups) do not increase that
much (see equation (27) in section 5), which in turn implies an almost negligible fall in the
producer price (relative standard deviation of 0.01 with respect to 0.59 in data).
The story is completely different with quadratic search costs. Although the initial reaction of
advertisement expenditures is similar, the persistence is much higher. Combined with   = 2,
it explains why surplus (markups) must strongly increase (see equation (27) in section 5). This
in turn allows for a much stronger fall in producer prices (relative standard deviation increases
from 0.01 with   = 1 to 0.24 with   = 2). As displayed in ﬁgure 2, quadratic search costs
also quite remarkably produce hump-shaped reactions for all variables. Indeed, although lin-
ear and quadratic costs generate similar initial increases in search costs, the initial increases in
search efforts (St and Dt) are much smaller with a quadratic relationship between efforts and
costs. As a result, only few new relationships are initially created which in turn affects invest-
ment and labour. Afterwards the hump-shaped reaction follows from the higher persistence in
search costs and therefore in search effort. We see that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of output
strongly increases and is close to what observed in data. Obviously, this also dampens further
the absolute volatility of output. Finally, we observe that search frictions do not modify much
(with respect to the standard RBC model) moments related to consumption, investment and
the factor prices.
From the above analysis, we see that product market frictions per se do not really improve re-
sults with respect to the standard real business cycle model. What is important to obtain a
hump-shaped reaction is to generate persistent search efforts and this can be achieved through
an adequate modelisation of search costs. Moreover, convex search costs require a strong re-
14action in markups which in turn allows for a high (and realistic) volatility of producer prices.
We now discuss further some of our parameters (we use the version with   = 2 but similar
conclusions would be reached with the version   = 1), and compare our results with other
existing attempts to generate hump-shaped reactions.
Bargaining power
The Hosios condition (γ = 1 − λ = 0.5) holds in the benchmark calibration. We look at the
effects of changes in the retailers’ bargaining power λ. A different λ does not change anything
but the way the surplus is split between wholesalers and retailers. The higher the parameter λ,
the higher is the surplus share the retailers receive, i.e. the lower is the producer price, the lower
is the wholesaler markup and the higher is the retailer markup. As a result, the price volatility
increases with λ.13 For instance, moving from λ = 0.1 to λ = 0.9 increases the relative standard
deviation of Pt from 0.05 to 0.45 (0.59 in data). It is also worth noting that higher retailer (resp.
lower wholesaler) markups allow them to bear higher (resp. lower) search costs. In other
words, the calibration still assumes total search costs representing 4.8% of output, but these
search costs are no more evenly distributed with λ  = 0.5.
Search costs
Total search costs themselves are uncertain. We associate search costs to advertising expen-
ditures for wholesalers and assume similar costs for retailers. This is certainly arbitrary and
maybe too restrictive. For instance, total marketing budgets (including all needed resources
as labour, capital, etc.) could be more informative for wholesalers. We let the total search
costs vary from 2.5% to 7.5% of output. It implies that the marginal cost moves from 0.95 to
0.85 (see equation (27) in section 5), or equivalently that total surplus (or total markup) moves
from 0.05 to 0.15. We can show that increasing search costs obviously decreases their volatility
and increases the volatility of producer prices (because of their lower steady state). Output
is also less volatile but more persistent. Moments for the other variables are also affected but
only marginally. In conclusion, higher frictions (search costs) combined with higher markups
for the retailers improve further the product market representation (higher price volatility and
lower cost volatility) but this improvement is not really dramatic. Similarly, we could ﬁne-tune
the results by allowing for different  ’s for wholesalers and retailers.
Price rigidities
In the model, prices are bargained every period without any cost. However, prices may be
subject to convex adjustment costs (see for instance Rotemberg (1982, 1983)) or staggered con-
tracts (see for instance Taylor (1999) or Calvo (1983)). In the extreme case (constant prices), the
volatility of the total markup would be unchanged but completely due to the volatility of the
13This is obvious from equation (25): ˆ Pt = − ˆ ϕR
t = λΛ
P ˆ Λt.
15wholesaler markup (the retailer markup remaining unchanged). As a result, the volatility of
the advertising expenditures also strongly increases. In other words, price rigidities destroy
(with respect to data) the cyclical properties of the product market. Again, since price rigidities
only change the split of the surplus between wholesalers and retailers, other cyclical properties
remain unchanged.
Comparison with other approaches
One success of the model (frictions with quadratic search costs) is to generate hump-shaped re-
actions for all variables. There are of course other existing explanations for such dynamics. For
instance, labour market search as in Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996) will lead to employment
being hump-shaped, but nor investment neither output. On the other hand, capital adjustment
costs produces hump-shaped investment but no hump-shaped labour and output. Combin-
ing the two may therefore lead to a dynamics similar to ours. Multi-sector models also have
interesting properties. Benhabib et al. (2006) show that a three-sector model has a strong propa-
gation mechanism under conventional parameterizations and lead to hump-shaped consump-
tion, output and investment. It however comes at the expenses of a too high labour volatility.
We instead generate hump-shaped reactions with only search in the product market without
relying upon any extra features.14
7 Welfare cost of inefﬁciencies
In the previous section, we conduct sensitivity analysis ( , λ and costs) keeping constant some
steady state values. We now ﬁx instead the parameters and see how changes in one of these
parameters affect the steady state, the dynamics and hence the welfare of the economy. In par-
ticular, we are interested to compute the welfare cost of the two product market inefﬁciencies
(see propositions 1 and 2 in section 4) to ultimately understand which inefﬁciency would be
meaningful to correct in order to efﬁciently improve welfare.
We follow Lucas (1987) and calculate the welfare cost as a fraction of the consumption a house-
hold would agree to give up each period in return for moving to the efﬁcient situation. We
deﬁne the expected welfare of an agent in the efﬁcient situation as:
We
t = log(Ce
t) + θ log(1− Ne
t) + βWe
t+1. (28)
Similarly, we deﬁne the expected welfare of an agent in the inefﬁcient situation as:
Wi
t = log(Ci
t) + θ log(1− Ni
t) + βWi
t+1. (29)
If the welfare cost of living in the inefﬁcient economy is ψ, equation (29) can be rewritten as:
Wi
t = log((1− ψ)Ce
t) + θ log(1− Ne
t) + βWi
t+1. (30)
14However, the multisector model is able to amplify shocks, which is not the case with the search model.
16By subtracting equation (28) from equation (30), we obtain the welfare cost of the inefﬁciency:
ψ = 1− exp((1− β)(Wi
t −We
t)). (31)
We use a second order approximation of equation (31) to avoid the certainty equivalence prop-
erty and take the model with quadratic search costs (  = 2 but   = 1 would lead to similar
qualitative results). We ﬁrst consider the search cost inefﬁciency. The efﬁcient situation We
t is
consideredwhenthe searchcostparameter κ isequaltozero(Walrasian steadystate, seepropo-
sition 1). We then increase κ and compute Wi
t for each value of κ. The function ψ(κ) increases
in κ, as displayed in ﬁgure 3. With our calibration (κ = 0.35, see table 1), an household would
be willing to give up 10% of her consumption each quarter to live in the efﬁcient/Walrasian
world. Such a high number is not surprising. Total search costs themselves already represent
4.8% of output, that is 6.1% of consumption.
We then consider the search externality inefﬁciency. We show in proposition 2 that when the
retailer’s bargaining power λ is equal to her search elasticity 1 − γ in the matching function,
the decentralised solution is equivalent to the social planner’s solution. This is our efﬁcient
solution We
t. We then move the bargaining power λ from 0.1 to 0.9 and compute Wi
t for each
valueof λ. Weobtain ψ(λ), asdisplayedinﬁgure4. Weseethat ψ(λ) = 0when λ = 1−γ = 0.5
(seecalibration in table 1). The welfarecost increaseswhen the distance between the bargaining
power and the matching elasticity increases. For instance, with a bargaining power of 0.2 or
0.8, an household would be willing to give up 3% of her consumption each quarter to live in
the social planner’s world. This welfare cost of search externalities is therefore small relative to
the welfare cost of the search costs.
[Insert ﬁgures 3 to 4 about here]
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model, where both wholesale and retail ﬁrms provide search
effort (i.e through advertising expenditures and employment of sales and purchasing man-
agers) to meet their customers in a product market with search frictions. Firms form long-term
contractual relationships and downstream producers or wholesalers bargain over prices with
upstream retailers, who in turn sell to the ﬁnal consumers. We show that the way search costs
are modelled is crucial for the results. In particular, convex search costs generate hump-shaped
reactions for all variables and provide nice statistical properties (compared to real data).
Our model remains simple and could be extended along several dimensions. For instance, in-
troducing inventories would break the one for one relationship between production and trade.
In good time, ﬁrms produce more and build inventories as long as new trade relationships are
17not formed. Also, introducing a monetary dimension (see Smets and Wouters (2003) or Chris-
tiano et al. (2005)) and comparing with the standard monopolistic competition New Keynesian
set up would be an exciting research programme. Moreover, the aim of this paper is rather
analytic (introduction of product market frictions and effects) but so far nothing is said on the
normative implications of our ﬁndings. For instance, given the strong adverse effects of search
frictions in the product market, policies aiming at reducing these imperfections (lower entry
barriers, role of subsidies, taxation, trade associations, ...) might prove powerful. Finally, we
could use this setup to discriminate between product market and labour market regulations
(see for instance Messina (2006) or Fang and Rogerson (2007) for models with monopolistic
competition). We leave these extensions to future research.
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21A The social planners’s problem
Social planner








(1− Nt)1−η − 1
￿￿
,
subject to the constraints:











Tt = F(Kt, Nt) = ǫtKα
t N1−α
t ,
Tt = (1− χ)Tt−1 + M(St,Dt).




























































































































































The central planner’s equilibrium is equivalent to the decentralized equilibrium if and only if
the ﬁrst order conditions (P1)-(P2)-(P3) are equivalent to the ﬁrst order conditions (D4)-(D5)-
(D6). We see that equations (P1) and (D4) are always identical. We also see that γ = 1 − λ is a
sufﬁcient and necessary condition to ensure that the system of equations (P2)-(P3) is equivalent
to the system of equations (D5)-(D6).
B The standard Walrasian real business cycle model














t = Ct + Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt,












C Quarterly US data
From 1971:q1 to 2006:q1.
Real producer price: Monthly PPI deﬂated by the monthly CPI. The monthly data are trans-
formed into quarterly ones. Source: BLS. Logged and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing
weight.
Advertising expenditures: Sum of quarterly advertising expenditures in newspaper (source:
http://www.naa.org/, seasonally adjusted using X12) and quarterly advertising expenditures
ininternet(source: http://www.iab.net/resources/ad_revenue.asp). ThesumisGDP-deﬂated,
logged and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.
GDP: Quarterly gross domestic product. Source: BEA. Logged and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600
23smoothing weight.
Consumption: Quarterly total private consumption. Source: BEA. Logged and HP-ﬁltered
with a 1600 smoothing weight.
Investment: Quarterly total private investment. Source: BEA. Logged and HP-ﬁltered with a
1600 smoothing weight.
Employment: Quarterly employment in the non farm business sector. Source: BLS. Logged
and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.
Wages: Quarterly hourly compensation in the non farm business sector. Source: BLS. Logged
and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.
Interest rate: Monthly 3-month Treasury bill nominal rate. Nominal rates are deﬂated by the
realized 3-month inﬂation rate. The monthly data are transformed into quarterly ones. Source:
Federale Reserve Bank of St Louis. HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.












Sources: www.galbithink.org/ad-spending.htm. The yearly nominal series are GDP-deﬂated, logged and HP-ﬁltered (λ = 100)
to extract the business cycle components.
Figure 1: Cyclical ﬂuctuations of real advertising expenditures
25β δ α θ η ρ σǫ
RBC 0.984 0.025 0.33 3.34 1 0.979 0.0072
  = 1 0.984 0.023 0.33 3.30 1 0.979 0.0072
  = 2 0.984 0.021 0.33 3.06 1 0.979 0.0072
λ γ χ κ ¯ m
  = 1 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.05 0.52
  = 2 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.35 0.51
Table 1: Parameter values
26relative
standard deviation
US data RBC   = 1   = 2
Pt 0.59 0.01 0.24
adt 2.57 2.89 4.53
GDPt (1.56) 1.00 (1.39) 1.00 (1.34) 1.00 (0.98) 1.00
Ct 0.81 0.44 0.44 0.50
It 3.41 3.38 3.47 3.62
Nt 1.00 0.49 0.51 0.49
wt 0.64 0.54 0.55 0.56
rt 0.31 0.03 0.03 0.02
ﬁrst-order contemporaneous
autocorrelation correlation with output
US data RBC   = 1   = 2 US data RBC   = 1   = 2
Pt 0.80 0.71 0.34 -0.17 -0.94 -0.37
adt 0.88 0.02 0.43 0.77 0.58 0.55
GDPt 0.88 0.72 0.78 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ct 0.88 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.86 0.94 0.95 0.92
It 0.92 0.71 0.79 0.88 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.97
Nt 0.94 0.71 0.70 0.58 0.83 0.97 0.96 0.69
wt 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.24 0.98 0.98 0.98
rt 0.55 0.71 0.71 0.87 -0.06 0.96 0.84 0.94
All variables have been logged (with the exception of the real interest rate) and detrended with the HP ﬁlter. US data: see Ap-
pendix C; RBC: standard Walrasian real business cycle model à la King and Rebelo (1999) presented in Appendix B;   = 1 and
  = 2: models with frictions in the product market presented in section 3. Numbers between brackets: absolute standard devia-
tions. Pt : realproducer price, adt = κS
 
t /  : advertisingexpenditures, GDPt = Ct + It : gross domesticproduct, Ct : consumption,
It : investment, Nt : employment, wt : wage, rt : interest rate.






























































Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a productivity shock












Figure 3: Welfare cost of search frictions














Figure 4: Welfare cost of matching externalities
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